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Abstract: We examine how charitable giving is influenced by who in the household is primarily 
responsible for giving decisions.  Looking first at single-person households, we find men and 
women to have significantly different tastes for giving, setting up a potential conflict for married 
couples.  We find that, with respect to total giving, married households tend to resolve these 
conflicts largely in favor of the husband's preferences. Bargaining over charitable giving, rather 
than letting one spouse take charge, reduces giving by about six percent. When the woman is the 
decision maker, she will still make a significantly different allocation of those charity dollars, 
preferring to give to more charities but to give less to each.  Our results give new insights into 
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I. Introduction 
Married couples make joint earning and spending decisions, they allocate goods and tasks within 
the home, they settle disagreements, and produce household public goods.  It is important for 
economists to ask how these decisions are made, and how economic variables affect the 
household dynamics.   However, the literature on intra-household decision making has been 
constrained by the difficulty of identifying, within consumption surveys, household consumption 
items that are clearly private goods for only one spouse, or clearly public goods for the 
household.  From those studies that have identified husband’s goods (e.g. husband’s leisure, 
men’s clothing), wife’s goods (e.g. wife’s leisure, women’s clothing) and public goods (e.g. 
children’s clothing, children’s nutrition), one consensus has emerged -- households are typically 
not governed by a sole benevolent head, as hypothesized by Becker (1981), but are better 
characterized by bargaining between spouses with different tastes and talents.
1   Still, much more 
remains to be learned about how households make decisions and how compromises are formed. 
One good that is usually a public good in the household is the family’s charitable giving.  
The average household gives between one and two percent of income to charity annually.  
Economists have long been concerned about how sensitive giving is to income and to the tax 
deduction for charity, and how these variables may affect the total amount of charity and the 
distribution of dollars across types of charities.  However, research has not taken into account the 
view that bargaining may characterize household decisions.  In addition, there is growing 
                                                 
1 For prominant examples theoretical models of household bargaining, see Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and 
Horney (1981), Chiaporri (1988, 1992) and Lundberg and Pollak (1993).   For empirical comparisons on the 
“unitary” household model of Becker (1981) and the bargaining models, see, for instance,  Schultz (1990), Thomas 
(1990), Hoddinott and Haddad,(1995), Haddad and Hoddinott (1994), Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997), and 
Browning and Chiaporri (1998).  Lundberg and Pollak (1996) provide an excellent synthesis of this literature, and  
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evidence that men’s and women’s tastes for giving could be quite different. For instance, Eller 
(1997) reports that women and men differ dramatically in their estate giving, while experimental 
research finds significant difference in how men’s and women’s giving responds to price and 
income.
2  If indeed men and women have different views on philanthropy, how are these 
conflicts resolved within a household? 
This paper explores a unique survey designed to learn about charitable giving, but which 
contains a question about who in the household is the primary decision maker on charity.  We 
draw on theories of intra-household resource allocation to frame an empirical investigation of the 
role of intra-household bargaining on the household’s charitable giving. In the next section we 
discuss a theoretical framework for approaching the problem.  In Section III, we describe our 
data. In Section IV we present evidence that single men and women do indeed have significantly 
different tastes for giving.  Section V turns to couples and estimates the impact of bargaining on 
the level of charitable donations.  We show that bargaining does indeed reduce giving, and that 
bargaining agreements predominantly favor men.  Section VI explores the endogeneity of who 
decides on charitable giving. As expected, we find that relative education and income are the 
primary determinants. Conclusions are in Section VII.  
 
II.  How Does Bargaining Within Marriage Affect Charitable Giving? 
                                                                                                                                                             
Alderman, et al. (1995) makes a case to favor a bargaining approach. 
2 Eller (1997) reports 37.6 percent of bequests3 to charity by men went to private foundations, while only 18.7 of 
that of women did.  Women gave 14.3 percent of their estates to religious organizations, in contrast to 5.4 percent by 
men.  Educational, medical, and scientific organizations drew 34.5 percent of women's charitable bequests but only 
21.5 percent of men's.  The differences overall level of philanthropy were much smaller: male donors contributed 
26.7 percent of their net worth, compared to 27.6 for women.   In a controlled experiment, Andreoni and Vesterlund 
(2001) found that men are significantly more price elastic than women, and that women are more “equalitarian.”  
 3 
Marriage allows two adults to share in several marriage-specific public goods, including 
charitable giving.  Marriage may also require that persons with distinct preferences devote 
resources to negotiating expenditure patterns, and this too extends to charitable donations.  In this 
section, we present a simple model to illustrate the effects of conflict in preferences between 
members of a couple on their charitable giving, and discuss how bargaining costs may discourage 
donations when tastes differ across partners. 
  To see how giving within marriage depends on the alignment of preferences, consider the 
case of two nearly-identical persons with two charitable options.  Except for their preferences 
over the two charities, these persons are identical. In particular, this husband and wife have the 
same income and bargaining power, but have utility functions 
Ui = U (ci, g, θi(d1, d2)),  i = h, w. 
Each person receives utility from his/her own consumption of private goods ci, from a marriage-
specific public good g, and from donations to two causes d1 and d2.  As single persons we assume 
they have identical levels of utility, and we assume that in marriage they will costlessly agree to 
an expenditure pattern that is Pareto efficient and yields equal utility for each partner.  
  Consider as a benchmark the case in which each person cares about only one of the two 
options, so that θh(d1, d2)=d1 and θw(d1, d2)=d2.  In this case donations are private goods within 
the marriage.  Since the two persons now share the cost of the public good g, the household 
economies free up resources for other expenditures.  If the donations are normal goods, then 
marriage will lead each person to donate more than he or she would as a single person. 
  Next consider a couple whose preferences are identical rather than orthogonal.  Suppose 
that each cares only about d1 so that θh(d1, d2)= θw(d1, d2)=d1. Each dollar donated now brings  
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satisfaction to both partners, making donations a public good in the household.  However, if as 
single individuals each would have given d1*, as a couple their donations may actually be more 
or less than 2d1*.  If there are no household economies in providing g, and assuming private 
consumption is a normal good, it follows from Samuelson efficiency conditions that giving by 
the couple will be above d1* but below 2d1*.  If the economies gained by forming the new 
household are significant, however, then this “income effect” will push giving up, perhaps even 
above 2d1*.  Still, compared to the orthogonal case in the prior paragraph, this household will 
spend less in total on giving.  The reason, obviously, is that donations are now jointly consumed.  
  Finally, consider a couple with opposing tastes in charities. In particular, suppose θh(d1, 
d2)=d1-d2 and θw(d1, d2)=d2-d1.  For example, one spouse might support the Republican Party and 
dislike Democrats, while the other displays the opposite loyalties.  In this case, donations fall to 
zero when the couple marries.   
  Married individuals, of course, typically choose each other, and evidence suggests mating 
is assortative across measurable characteristics such as education (see for example Pencavel 
1998).  It is thus likely that two married individuals have greater similarity on tastes for giving 
then any couple formed at random.   But unless tastes are identical a couple may bargain over the 
dispensation of charitable dollars, and this bargaining can be costly. The cost can be 
inframarginal (deciding whether or not to give) or marginal (deciding how much to give), and 
costs at the margin may be increasing (you have to argue harder for the last few dollars given).  
Both types of costs should work to further diminish a household’s contribution to charity.   
  There are also some couples that don’t get along well enough to reach a bargaining 
solution in the first place.  These may be in the “separate-spheres” outcome described by  
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Lundberg and Pollak (1993).  In this case, couples choose not to divorce and sacrifice the 
household economies of scale, but the allocations within the marriage are characterized by a non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium in which both partners make giving decisions, each independently. 
Whether the Nash-bargained level of giving is higher or lower than giving by the couple that 
bargains efficiently will depend on the alignment of tastes across charities.  In particular, the 
noncooperative equilibrium will supply less of marriage-specific public goods (including 
donations to charities both spouses enjoy) and more of the private goods (including donations to 
charities only one spouse enjoys). 
  One way to test the effect of bargaining costs on giving is to look at choices of 
households in which one spouse cedes charitable decision-making authority to the other.  Even if 
prior bargaining determined who would be the decision-maker, single-person decision-making 
suggests that there is not much bargaining going on at the margin that would drive up the price of 
donations.  Among couples who make decisions jointly, giving may be restrained at the margin 
by the costliness of reaching agreement.   
  The interest in this question, of course, rests on husbands and wives differing in their 
tastes for giving.  Accordingly, we begin by exploring the giving patterns for single men and 
single women to see if they differ significantly by gender. Before turning to these results, we 
describe our data set. 
III. The Data 
We use household surveys conducted in 1992 and 1994 by the Gallup Organization, and 
commissioned by Independent Sector, which were designed to measure giving and volunteering 
behaviors.  These two independent cross sections were randomly drawn from the United States,  
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and surveys were conducted in person with one adult member of the household.  Both surveys 
include a question on who within the household allocates money to charities; the question is 
worded, "Who in your household is considered most involved in deciding which charities your 
household will give to?"  The responses to this question are central to our analysis. 
Pooling the 1992 and 1994 data gives a sample of 4180 households.
4  Eliminating 
observations missing key variables leaves us with a sample of 3572, including 2560 who are 
married.
5   Among married couples, 53 percent report that decisions about charitable giving are 
made jointly, 19 percent say the husband is most involved in deciding, and 28 percent respond 
that the wife is the primary decision-maker. Table A1 in the appendix provides detailed 
definitions of key variables, while other tables and summary statistics are available from the 
authors.  
Because of the charitable deduction for households that itemize deductions on the 
personal income tax, it will often cost a household less than a dollar for each dollar given away.  
For example, a household in the 31 percent marginal tax bracket that itemizes faces a tax price of 
69 cents for each dollar donated.  For a household that does not itemize, however, the price 
remains one.
6  Since our survey does not report marginal tax rates, we calculate the tax price of 
giving for each household using information on itemization status, number of household 
                                                 
4 Independent Sector also collected data for 1988, 1990, 1996, and 1999.  We do not use the 1990 data because it is 
missing information on spouse’s human capital variables.  We do not use the 1996 data because the question of who 
is most involved in charity decisions is only asked to those who contribute to charity. The 1988 and 1999 data are, 
respectively, no longer and not yet available at the time of this study. 
5  In total, we eliminate 503 observations where the respondent is neither the primary earner nor the spouse of the 
primary earner, 51 observations where the charity decision is not made by the respondent or the respondent’s spouse 
or jointly by the respondent and the spouse, 40 observations missing the respondent’s or respondent’s spouse’s age 
and 14 observations missing family size. 
6  The deductibility of gifts from state tax returns introduces additional variability to the price of gifts. Unfortunately, 
we do not know the residency of the households in the sample, so we cannot include state taxes in the price.  
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members, gross income, probable filing status, and the tax schedules for the relevant year.  Our 
final sample includes 3,045 households with the information needed for this calculation.
7    
IV. Single Men and Single Women: What are the Gender Differences? 
We first look for gender differences in the decision to give.  The first two columns of Table 1 
contain the results of the probit estimation of the probability of making a charitable donation for 
each sex.  As expected, the price variable has a negative effect for both single men and single 
women.  The coefficient on the income variable is positive for both, but is statistically significant 
only for single men.  The dummy variables for education have significant positive effects for 
both.   Comparing these two equations, we find that the behavior of males and females is, in fact, 
significantly different.  The hypothesis that they behave identically can be rejected at the 0.10 
level of significance (χ
2(12) = 19.69, p-value=.073).   
  Turn next to the levels of contributions. In our analysis, as in much of the literature, the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the dollar amount of contributions.
8   Because 31 percent 
of our sample reported no contributions, we estimate the giving functions with a tobit 
specification (censored at zero).  The results of the estimation are presented in the third and 
fourth columns of Table 1.  As expected, the tax price has a negative effect in both equations, 
and the effect is significant for single males.  Income has a positive and significant effect in both 
equations.  As is common in the literature on charitable giving, age and education variables tend 
to have positive and significant coefficients. As with the probability equations, the hypothesis 
that the equations for amount given are the same for single men and single women is rejected, 
                                                 
7  For the analysis of  how much households give to charity in Sections IV and V we have excluded the observations 
with missing income data.  However, we do use these observations when analyzing who is in charge of the charity 
decision in Section VI.  
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here at a .05 level of confidence (χ
2(12) = 21.30, p-value = .046).   Hence, we can confidently say 
that, overall, single men and women display different tendencies toward giving. 
 
V. Married Couples: What Differences Remain? 
  The possibility of assortative mating suggests that differences found between single 
people will exaggerate the expected differences between married individuals.  If preferences for 
charity constitute a main criterion in spousal selection, or are correlated with the main criteria, 
then we may see no significant differences been male and females in married couples.    
  We address this possibility by classifying couples according to the three assignments of 
decision-making authority of charitable donations: the husband decides, the wife decides, and 
they make decisions jointly.  Note that couples can differ in three ways: whether they give, how 
much they give, and to what types of organizations they give.  We will explore gender 
differences within the marriage for all three dimensions of giving.  
Table 3 reports the probit equations estimating the likelihood of making a gift.  We 
estimate separate equations for each type of couple: husband-decides, wife-decides, and joint-
deciders.  As expected, the tax price has a negative effect and income a positive effect in all three 
equations, although income is significant only for joint deciders.  Looking at the effect of 
education, a noteworthy pattern appears.  In the husband-decides equation the husband’s 
educational variables are positive and significant, as expected, but the educational variables for 
the wife are insignificant.  Likewise, in the wife-decides equation the wife’s educational 
variables are postive and (mostly) significant, while the husband’s are not.  For joint-deciders, 
                                                                                                                                                             
8  Recent reviews of this literature include Brown (1997) and Clotfelter (1997).  
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however, only the educational variables for the husband are positive and significant.   These 
results strongly suggest of a model of bargaining, rather than unitary and altruistic decision 
making. 
The tobit estimates of the amount-given equations, shown in the last three columns of 
Table 2, show a similar pattern.   Again, the tax price effects are negative, and the effect of 
income is positive and significant in all three equations.  And as we saw in the likelihood-of-
giving equations, only the decision maker’s own educational attainment is significant in the 
regressions, and when couples decide jointly only the husband’s education is significant. 
As with singles, we ask whether these gender differences are significant.   For each set of 
regressions we conducted tests across all pairings of the equations. Interestingly, the only 
significant difference occurs when comparing joint-deciding households to wife-deciding 
households.  Moreover, this difference was found for both the probability-of-giving (χ
2(16) 
=24.26, p-value=.017) and the amount-of-giving (χ
2(16) =29.42, p-value=.021) regressions.   
This is particularly striking in light of the fact that there was no significant difference between 
married males and married females, nor between married males and couples for either the 
probability- or amount-of-giving equations.  This result suggests that jointly deciding couples 
behave differently from males and from females—even though male and female deciders 
themselves are not significantly different from each other—and that the compromise behavior is 
especially far from the choices of female deciders.  
Next we turn to the question of how gifts are distributed across the different types of 
charities.  Our data allow us to look at the distribution across twelve different functional 
categories of charitable activity.  Here we will see the gender difference again growing larger.    
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Looking at the means across these twelve areas of charitable activity, an interesting 
pattern emerges.
 9  Among single people, women are more likely than men to give to every single 
category of charity except one—adult-recreation.   Among married people, women more likely 
than men to give to all but two categories—adult-recreation and public-benefit. Looking at levels 
of giving, women also seem to spread their giving dollars more thinly than men, while men 
appear to have a greater tendency to concentrate their giving.  Are these differences significant? 
To answer this question, we constructed a test based on a Herfindahl index of the 
concentration of giving.  The Herfindahl index equals one if the household gives to only one type 
of organization, such as religious groups, while if dollars are spread evenly among all twelve 
types of organizations the index will reach its lower bound, which in our case is 0.083.  The 
average value of the Herfindahl index for married couples with a male decision maker is 0.64, 
with a female decision maker is 0.59 and for couples deciding jointly is 0.63.  Tests reveal that 
indeed married male decision makers concentrate their giving significantly more than married 
female decision makers.  However, when couples decide jointly, the concentration is not 
significantly different from when males decide alone, but is significantly different from when 
females decide.
10 Notice, this is the same pattern seen in the giving equations.  
 
How does this difference manifest itself across charities?  In Table 3 we present predicted 
values for the probability and magnitude of gifts for the twelve areas for a representative 
household.    The table shows predictions for a white, church-going family of three, headed by 
two adults who are high school graduates. The family’s income is $39,785 and the family faces a 
                                                 
9  Tables are available from the authors, or at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~andreoni/. 
10 A detailed description of the Herfindahl Index is given in the appendix. These test the difference in conditional 
expectations of the Herfindahl Index.  
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charity price of 0.85.  The husband is 45 years old and the wife is 43.   
The table reveals several interesting differences.  Panel A shows that married women are 
significantly more likely to give to health and education than are either married men or jointly-
deciding couples, and husbands are significantly more likely to give to adult recreation than are 
couples.  Jointly-deciding couples, however, generally look more like husbands than wives, with 
one exception — husbands are significantly more likely to give charity than couples. 
Panel B shows another interesting difference in amounts given.  Females give much more 
to Health and Human Services than couples and, regardless of who decides, religious 
organizations constitute the category that receives the greatest level of support.  But as before, 
couples deciding jointly seem to look more like males than females.   
Since the predictions in Table 3 are made for a particular household, it raises the question 
of whether similar differences are found as we change key variables, such as the price of giving.  
Figure 1 shows predictions for the median household over a variety of prices.  At the price of 
0.69 we would predict that married men would give more than married women.  As the price of 
giving rises the difference vanishes, and when the price is unity females are giving more than 
males—a result that is strikingly similar to experimental findings (Andreoni and Vesterlund 
2001). We can also ask whether the composition of giving also changes with price.  A simple 
way to characterize this is by separating religious giving from all giving.   Figure 1 shows that 
differences in religious contributions account for 64% of the difference in male and female 
giving at the price of 0.69, but is responsible for over 100% of the difference at prices 0.72 and 
0.85.  This indicates that as the price rises, the marital differences over the composition of giving 
appear more extreme.    
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V. Joint Decision Making: Does Bargaining Depress Giving? 
We have now shown that many of the differences identified with single people carry over to 
married couples.  Household decision making, therefore, seems more consistent with bargaining 
than with maximizing a single household utility function.  In this section, we look more closely 
at this bargaining interpretation of our data.  Looking at the amount given to charity by couples 
who decide jointly, we estimate their choice as a linear combination of the amount the husband 
would choose, were he in charge, and the amount the wife would choose were she in charge.  
 Let    Xm and  Xf   be the characteristics of males and females, including household income, 
price of giving, own age and own education, but excluding spouse's age and education. Define 
the vectors Bm and Bf as ordinary regression coefficients, and let am and af be scalars.  Then let Im 
be an indicator variable equal to one if the male is primary charity decision maker, and let If  and 
Ic  equal one when the female or couple is the decider, respectively.  Finally, let G be the level of 
charitable giving by the household.  Then consider the regression equation 
 G = (Im + am Ic) Xm Bm  + (If  +  af Ic) Xf Bf  + e, 
where e is a random error term with a zero mean.   When the male is the decider  B X = G m m m ˆ ˆ  
will serve as the predicted gift, and when the female is the decider it is  B X = G f f f ˆ ˆ .  However, 
when the couple makes the decision the prediction is 
. G a + G a =
 
B X a + B X a = G
f f m m
f f f m m m c
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
  




An important aspect of this formulation is that we do not constrain the scalars am and af in 
any way.  For instance, if am and af  sum to one then this would imply that in making a joint 
decision the household neither creates nor destroys any dollars of charity.  By contrast, if am and 
af sum to more than one, then extra charity is created.  This would imply some increasing return 
to joint decisions, such as complementary expertise in identifying efficient charities, or through 
information-sharing that leads at least one spouse to come to appreciate and to derive utility from 
the other’s charitable choices.  Finally, am and  af  could sum to less than one, in which case the 
bargaining is destroying some charity.  For instance, spouses could oppose each other's charities 
and decide jointly in order to monitor their spouse’s giving.  Also, bargaining from divergent 
views could lead to more costly decision making, which itself leads to fewer decisions made and 
fewer dollars spent.   
Estimating the a's we find values (and standard errors) of  am ˆ  = 0.677 (0.163) and  a f ˆ = 
0.260 (0.160), while their sum is   a + a f m ˆ ˆ  = 0.936 (0.033). The sum of am and af  is significantly 
below one, and as a result we can say that, when bargaining is involved, giving is reduced by 
about six percent.  Hence, couples in our study appear to be deciding jointly for one of the two 
reasons stated: they have differing tastes and are reining each other in, or they are in a non-
cooperative separate-spheres type of living arrangement. 
What do the relative values of am ˆ  and a f ˆ  tell us?  Earlier results suggested that the 
decisions of couples tended to look more like those of husbands than of wives, and these 
estimates bear this out.  While both am ˆ  and a f ˆ  are significantly different from zero, am ˆ  is  
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almost three times a f ˆ .  This provides more evidence that husbands are indeed prevailing in the 
marital bargain over charitable giving.   
Notice that because these estimates are drawn entirely from married couples, the 
differences cannot be due to self-selection into marriage.  There may, of course, be selection into 
the modes of decision-making.  This possibility is explored next.  
 
VI.  Who Decides? 
Given the significance of who is the decision maker, it is natural to ask what factors influence the 
selection of decision makers. We explore this using a multinomial logistic modeling of the 
choice of decider, with results presented in Tables 4 and 5.  The base case is that the woman 
decides, hence the first column of estimates gives the effect of each variable on the probability 
that the man decides, and the second column looks at the probability that the decision is made 
jointly.  In Table 4 we include a dummy variable equal to one if the household reports the male is 
the primary earner.  Since this may be endogenous to the choice of charity decision maker, Table 
5 presents instrumented predictions of whether the man is expected to be the primary earner.  The 
other variables intended to reflect human capital are relative age, measured as the man's age 
minus the woman's, and relative educational attainment.  To control for cohort effects, we 
include average age and average education in the household.  We also include ethnicity and 
churchgoing to account for culture and tastes, and we include family size as it may influence the 
bargaining powers and the threat-point for separate-spheres bargaining.   
Table 4 shows that the coefficient on who is the primary earner is large and statistically 
significant -- if the husband is reported to be the primary earner, he is far more likely to make the  
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giving decisions, the couple is somewhat more likely, and the wife is less likely.  If being the 
primary earner strengthens one’s bargaining power in a marriage, then this suggests that, on 
average, being the charity provider is a task that people seek, and that the value to being the 
charity decider conveys an advantage that outweighs any cost that comes with it. 
We also see in Table 4 that age differences are not a significant influence on who is the 
decider, but educational differences are.  The greater the husband’s education relative to the 
wife’s, the greater the likelihood that the husband or the couple is the decider, although couples 
with higher average levels of education are more likely to make joint decisions.  This is 
consistent with the view that education is linked to bargaining power, and decision-making is a 
utility-providing privilege.  It could also be true, however, that more educated spouses are more 
skilled at evaluating worthy charities.  An additional finding is that in Hispanic households the 
male is unilaterally more likely to be reported to be the decision-maker.  
To avoid having the endogenous primary-earner variable on the right-hand side, we also 
perform a two-stage estimation in which the first stage predicts primary earner status from age, 
education, occupation of head, family size, and ethnic variables, which we report in Table 5. The 
key exclusion restrictions in the first stage are that the occupation of the head predicts whether 
the primary earner is male or female, but has no effect on who makes the charity decisions. The 
other exclusion restriction is that the returns to education differ by education level in the first 
stage but not in the second. 
As before, Table 5 shows that the probability that the man is the sole decision-maker is 
still increasing in his educational advantage relative to his partner, and average education still 
increases the likelihood that decisions are made jointly.  Beyond that, however, the results from  
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this table differ greatly from those in Table 4.  Increasing the likelihood that the male is the 
primary earner significantly increases the likelihood that either he or the couple makes the 
decisions, while increasing the likelihood that the female is the primary earner decreases the 
likelihood of her being the sole decider.  Moreover, as the probability that the male is the primary 
earner goes to one, the probability of the male being to sole decider goes to 0.16, and that of the 
female goes to about 0.31.  By contrast, as the probability that the female is the primary earner 
goes to one, the probability that she is the sole decider goes to zero and that for the couple goes 
to one.   
This suggests two things.  First, the results reported in Table 4 are likely to be driven by 
unobserved bargaining power that leads one member of the household to be both the primary 
earner and the charity decision-maker.  Second, it suggests an interesting dynamic in household 
decisions in which the male, as he loses power over the household’s earnings, bargains harder to 
retain at least shared control over the household’s decisions on charity.  
VII.  Summary and Conclusion 
Several striking patterns pervade the analysis.  First, single men and women are significantly 
different in their propensities to give, the amount they give, and the distributions of those gifts.  
Hence, there are clear, systematic sex differences when it comes to charitable giving.   
How are these differences resolved within a marriage?  Our findings argue against the 
hypothesis that a married couple behaves as if governed by a single utility function and are more 
consistent with a model of household bargaining. 
We also find that decision making over charitable giving is reasonably interpreted as a 
privilege as well as a task, and that when a particular spouse has sole control the decisions seem  
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to reflect his or her own tastes.  But when decisions are made jointly, we find that the 
“compromise” achieves about 68 percent of the male preference and only 26 percent of the 
female preference.  The sum of these weights is significantly less than one, suggesting that the 
costliness of bargaining reduces giving on average by six percent.
Although the marital bargain on charity mostly favors men when it comes to total giving, 
when women do become the deciders we find that they wield their power to influence the 
disbursement of the family’s charity.  By contrast to men, women tend to give to a greater variety 
of charitable activities, giving less to each.  Women especially favor health and education, while 
men are more generous than women only within the sphere of adult recreation. 
Finally, how does the couple select who will take the task of being the charitable decision 
maker?  Our analysis finds an important simultaneity between the household choice of primary 
wage earner and decision maker on charity—unobserved variables seem to devolve the two roles 
onto the same spouse. 
An important aspect of our results is that they provide direct evidence to support the 
growing feeling among fund-raisers that men and women behave very differently with respect to 
charitable giving.  Men are more sensitive to both price and income, for instance, and tend to 
concentrate their giving among fewer kinds of charities.  And when the price of giving is low, 
men tend to give more to charity than women, but when the price is high the opposite is true.  
In sum, by looking at the family as a complicated institution our analysis reveals a rich 
and complex set of relationships between gender, economic status, tastes for charity, and 
bargaining strength.  Further exploration into charity as well as other household public goods 
could prove to be an exciting frontier for further economic research.  
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Table 1 
Probability of Giving and Total Contributions to Charity 
 
  Probability of Giving (Probit)  Total Contributions (Tobit) 
  Single  Single  Single  Single 
  Males  Females  Males  Females 
Ln(Price)  -1.112  -0.868  -3.135  -2.496 
  (0.71)  (0.73)  (1.86)  (1.90) 
Ln(Income)  0.271*  0.171  1.108*  0.916* 
  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.33)  (0.29) 
Age of  Male  0.009  ---  0.032*  --- 
  (0.00)  ---  (0.01)  --- 
Age of  Female  ---  0.003  ---  0.021 
  ---  (0.00)  ---  (0.01) 
Male HS Grad  0.502*  ---  1.769*  --- 
  (0.22)  ---  (0.66)  --- 
Male Attd. Coll.  0.997*  ---  3.404*  --- 
  (0.22)  ---  (0.65)  --- 
Male Col. Grad  0.732*  ---  2.576*  --- 
  (0.23)  ---  (0.69)  --- 
Female HS Grad  ---  0.409*  ---  1.619* 
  ---  (0.16)  ---  (0.50) 
Female Attd. Coll.  ---  0.453*  ---  1.888* 
  ---  (0.19)  ---  (0.57) 
Female Coll Grad  ---  0.840*  ---  2.905* 
  ---  (0.23)  ---  (0.64) 
Hispanic  -0.411  -0.006  -1.225  0.26 
  (0.24)  (0.21)  (0.71)  (0.61) 
Black  -0.146  0.166  -0.488  0.467 
  (0.22)  (0.16)  (0.64)  (0.47) 
Family Size  -0.034  -0.016  -0.144  -0.0813 
  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.16)  (0.14) 
Church-Goer  0.569*  0.415*  2.080*  1.696* 
  (0.16)  (0.13)  (0.44)  (0.36) 
year=1992  0.308*  -0.309*  0.895  -0.837* 
  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.43)  (0.36) 
Constant  -3.683*  -1.947*  -13.39*  -9.580* 
  (1.12)  (0.94)  (3.30)  (2.77) 
Standard Error  ---  ---  3.597*  3.613* 
  ---  ---  (0.19)  (0.16) 
#obs  368  500  368  500 
#obs censored  ---  ---  147  182 
log-likelihood  -204.65  -291.95  -709.79  -1015.74 
*estimate is significant at a 5% level. (standard errors in parentheses)  
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Table 2  
Charitable Giving Functions for Married Couple, by Who Decides 
  Probability of Giving (Probit)  Total Contributions (Tobit) 
   Husbands   Wives  Joint  Husbands  Wives  Joint 
 Ln(Price)   -0.971   -0.749   -0.445  -3.455   -2.177   -1.832 
   (0.81)   (0.64)   (0.43)  (1.76)  (1.20)  (0.99) 
Ln(Income)  0.1726  0.203  0.211*  0.793*  0.810*  0.861* 
   (0.15)   (0.12)   (0.09)  (0.37)  (0.25)  (0.22) 
Age of  Male   0.012  0.017  0.001  0.050  0.046  0.007 
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Age of  Female   -0.007  -0.012  0.012  -0.023  -0.022   0.040 
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Male HS Grad  0.766*  0.074  0.091  2.140*  0.309  0.563 
   (0.23)   (0.19)   (0.14)  (0.60)  (0.40)  (0.36) 
Male Attd. Coll.   1.033*   0.149   0.431*  3.133*  0.649  1.491* 
   (0.26)   (0.21)   (0.16)  (0.64)  (0.43)  (0.39) 
Male Col. Grad   0.719*   0.016   0.391*  2.671*  0.335  1.537* 
   (0.30)   (0.25)   (0.17)  (0.71)  (0.48)  (0.42) 
Female HS Grad   -0.205   0.326   0.137  -0.477  0.857*  0.329 
   (0.22)   (0.19)   (0.14)  (0.54)  (0.43)  (0.38) 
Female Attd. Coll.   -0.114   1.115*   0.135  -0.170  2.263*  0.403 
   (0.27)   (0.23)   (0.17)  (0.64)  (0.46)  (0.42) 
Female Coll Grad   0.188   0.790*   0.322  0.171  2.160*  0.890 
   (0.32)   (0.26)   (0.19)  (0.71)  (0.53)  (0.46) 
Hispanic   -0.194   -0.157   -0.263  -0.469  -0.518  -0.789* 
   (0.21)   (0.19)   (0.15)  (0.52)  (0.39)  (0.38) 
Black   -0.387   -0.198   -0.243  -0.849  -0.786  -0.822 
   (0.25)   (0.21)   (0.17)  (0.61)  (0.43)  (0.42) 
Family Size   0.032   0.007   0.049  0.097  0.040  0.155 
   (0.06)   (0.05)   (0.04)  (0.14)  (0.10)  (0.09) 
Church-Goer  0.756*  0.547*  0.516*  2.484*  1.776*  2.066* 
  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.09)  (0.35)  (0.25)  (0.22) 
year=1992   0.167   0.054   -0.026  0.522  0.517*  0.230 
   (0.15)   (0.13)   (0.09)  (0.36)  (0.25)  (0.22) 
Constant   -2.640   -2.570*   -2.970*  -10.047*  -8.792*  -10.707* 
   (1.54)   (1.21)   (0.89)  (3.80)  (2.53)  (2.25) 
Standard Error  ---  ---   1140  3.250*  2.904*  3.310* 
  ---  ---   -576.35  (0.14)  (0.10)  (0.09) 
#obs  412  625  1140  412  625  1140 
# obs censored  ---   ---  ---  112  138  287 
log-likelihood   -201.55   -279.58  -576.35  -887.87  -1357.91  -2530.30 





Differences in Charitable Giving by Couples Across Areas of Charitable Activity, by Who Decides 
 
 



































All  Charities  87.8  83.3  77.2 0.69  3.79* 1.39 
Health  27.1 44.3  28.4 4.47**  0.04 6.55** 
Education  13.9  25.6  16.1 2.89*  0.16 3.24* 
Religious  Organizations  75.6  80.3  67.9 0.50 1.26  4.86** 
Human  Services  27.7  31.4  24.8 0.24 0.20 1.33 
Environment  10.7  10.5  15.0 0.00 0.67 1.02 
Public/Society  Benefit  8.7  9.5  5.3 0.03 0.84 1.64 
Recreation - Adults  9.5  5.3  2.6  1.29  2.83*  0.35 
Arts, Culture & Humanities  2.6  8.9  7.6  0.32  0.92  0.25 
Youth  Development  23.3  24.3  21.7 0.02 0.06 0.22 
Private Community  
Foundations  
4.3  11.1  5.5 2.18 0.15 2.26 
International/Foreign  3.5  6.3  4.3 0.26 0.03 0.29 
Other  1.7  1.0  1.0 0.24 0.26 0.00 
B.  Differences in the Estimated Amounts Married Males and Females Give to Specific Types of Charities 
All  Charities  1186.59  1099.49  1078.90 0.21 0.40 0.02 
Health 49.51  102.78  64.99  4.40**  0.62  3.32* 
Education  40.90  80.86  59.22 1.97 0.62 0.83 
Religious  Organizations 816.66  770.89  789.32 0.08 0.03 0.02 
Human  Services  113.27  162.74  90.32 1.11 0.44  4.59** 
Environment  10.11  12.13  15.5 0.09 0.65 0.33 
Public/Society  Benefit  11.26  14.20  7.71 0.12 0.35 1.31 
Recreation  -  Adults  2.98  7.40  10.53 0.35 2.15 0.35 
Arts, Culture & Humanities  3.10  11.03  6.69  1.15  0.43  0.47 
Youth  Development  30.17  28.44  27.51 0.03 0.10 0.02 
Private Community 
Foundations  
3.52  7.54  3.52 1.17 0.14  3.50* 
International/Foreign  6.59  7.31  5.26 0.02 0.11 0.33 
Other  2.73  3.25  1.52 0.06 0.67 1.71 
Note: These probabilities are constructed from estimating probit models where the dependent variable is whether the 
household gave to the specific charity type.  The probabilities estimates are the predicted probability for a white, 
church-going 45-year old,  family of 3 with ln(income) =10.59125 and price of charity = .85 in 1992. The male is 45 
years-old.  The female is 43 years-old. Both the male and female have high school degrees. Also, no male givers with 
only a high school degree gave to foreign charities. The prediction in the case of foreign charities was done for males 
and females who attended college.  Test statistics are distributed χ
2(1) under the null-hypothesis that the predictions 
are equal.  



























How Households Choose the Primary Giver 
Multinomial Logit Model     
 
   
Probability that the 
Male is the Giver 
   
Probability that the Couple 
Shares Giving 
Responsibility     
Male is Primary Earner 
   
 0.908* 
   
 0.262     
 
   
 (0.24) 
   
 (0.15)     
Male Age less Female Age 
   
 -0.008 
   
 -0.006     
 
   
 (0.01) 
   
(0.01)     
Male Education less Female Education 
   
 0.280* 
   
 0.154*     
 
   
 (0.07) 
   
 (0.05)     
Average Age 
   
 0.004 
   
 0.003     
 
   
 (0.005) 
   
 (0.004)     
Average Education 
   
 0.000 
   
 0.172*     
 
   
 (0.07) 
   
 (0.05)     
Hispanic 
   
 0.416* 
   
 -0.225     
 
   
 (0.18) 
   
 (0.16)     
Black 
   
 0.092 
   
 -0.370*     
 
   
 (0.21) 
   
 (0.17)     
Family Size 
   
 0.007 
   
 -0.064     
 
   
 (0.05) 
   










(0.10)     
Constant 
   
 -1.538* 
   
 0.081     
  
   
 (0.42) 
   
 (0.31)     
Predicted Probability if Male is the Primary Earner 
   
0.175 
   
0.565     
Predicted Probability if Female is the Primary Earner 
   
0.092 
   
0.568     
# obs 
   
2560 
   
     
Log-Likelihood 
   
-2527.079 
   
 
 
Note: The predicted probabilities are for a church going family of 3 that includes a 45-year old, high school 
graduate, white male and a 43-year old, high school graduate, white female.  Female being the primary giver is the 
base category.  
(standard errors in parentheses) 
 *estimate is significant at a 5% level.  
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Table 5 
How Households Choose the Primary Giver 
Two-Stage Multinomial Logit Model     
 
   
Probability that the 
Male is the Giver 
   
Probability that the Couple 
Shares Giving 
Responsibility     
Prediction of Male Earnings less Female Earnings 
   
 -0.160 
   
 -0.209*     
 
   
 (0.16) 
   
 (0.09)     
Male Age less Female Age 
   
 -0.016 
   
 -0.015     
 
   
 (0.02) 
   
(0.01)     
Male Education less Female Education 
   
 0.420* 
   
 0.311*     
 
   
 (0.13) 
   
 (0.09)     
Average Age 
   
 0.007 
   
 0.006     
 
   
 (0.01) 
   
 (0.004)     
Average Education 
   
 -0.018 
   
 0.150*     
 
   
 (0.07) 
   
 (0.06)     
Hispanic 
   
 0.396 
   
 -0.245     
 
   
 (0.21) 
   
 (0.18)     
Black 
   
-0.019 
   
 -0.496*     
 
   
 (0.25) 
   
 (0.20)     
Family Size 
   
 0.043 
   
 -0.022     
 
   
 (0.06) 
   










(0.11)     
Constant 
   
 -0.946 
   
 0045     
  
   
 (0.47) 
   
 (0.35)     
Predicted Probability if Male is the Primary Earner With 95.7% 
Probability 
   
0.165 
   
0.531 
   
Predicted Probability if Male is the Primary Earner With 92.0% 
Probability 
   
0.168 
   
0.568 
   
Predicted Probability if Male is the Primary Earner With 85.3% 
Probability 
   
0.169 
   
0.603 
   
# obs 
   
2560 
   
     
Log-Likelihood 





Note: First stage logit estimates are available upon request. The dependent variable for the logit is Primary Earner is 
Male. The explanatory variables are Age of Male, Age of Female, the six education indicators, Black, Hispanic, 
Family Size, Church-Goer, an indicator variables that the head of the household’s occupation is professional, low-
skilled, in the service-sector or a Trade job.   The predicted probabilities are for a church-going family of 3 that 
includes a 45-year old, high school graduate, white male and a 43-year old, high school graduate, white female.  
Female being the primary giver is the base category.  For hypothesis testing the bootstrapped distribution is assumed 
to be approximately normal (bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses). 












Primary Earner is Male 
 
Respondents are asked, “Are you the chief wage earner?”  If the respondent 
answers “No” then the individual is asked, “Who is the chief wage earner in this 
household?”  The respondent can answer Husband, Wife, Father, Mother, Son, 
Daughter, Other Male, Other Female. The observation is only used if respondent 
or spouse if the primary earner.  If the male is the chief wage earner then the 
Primary Earner variable equals 1, if the female is the primary earner it equals 0. 
 
Gives to Charity 
 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent has given to at least one of the 




The sum of the amount of money the respondent has reported giving to each of the 




Equals one minus the marginal tax rate for itemizers, and one for non-itemizers. 
Tax rates are calculated from information on income, itemization status, and other 




Respondents reported income in one of 13 before-tax income ranges. We use the 
midpoint of the range to which they belong as the income measure, in 1993 
dollars.  For those who report earning less than $7000 we use $5000 and for those 
who report earning more than $100000 we use $125000. 
 
Age of Male  
Age of Female 
 
Age of respondent or spouse, as appropriate. 
 
Male or Female 
HS Grad, Attend College, 
College Grad, 
 
Indicator variables for highest level of education obtained.  The omitted category 




These are indicators for the race of the respondent.  The data set only contains 




This is the response to the question, “How many persons including yourself and 




Indicator that respondent claims to go to church or synagogue services at least 




Let Sj ,  j=1,...,12, be the amount of  charity the respondent gives to charity class  j 
in the previous calendar year divided by the total amount of charity given.  The 
Herfindahl Index equals  . S
2
j ∑   We only calculate this index for respondents who 
have given to at least one charity in the previous calendar year. See Hirschman 
(1964) for details.  
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Table A2 







































(0.29)     












  (0.49) (0.49)  (0.46)  (0.43)  (0.45) 
Total Contributions  401.066  315.640  928.316  741.110  872.219   
  (1407.37) (688.38) (2075.12)  (1730.84)  (1850.35) 
Price 0.924  0.948  0.895  0.895  0.879   
  (0.12) (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12) 
 





















(29.67)   
Age of  Male 
 






48.966   
 
 






(15.31)   








46.369   








(14.82)   
Male HS Grad 
 






0.279   
 
 






(0.45)   
Male Attd. Coll. 
 






0.243   
 
 






(0.43)   
Male Col. Grad 
 






0.328   
 
 






(0.47)   








0.358   








(0.48)   








0.244   








(0.43)   








0.270   

































































Church-Goer 0.337  0.549  0.559  0.542  0.618 
  (0.47)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.49) 
year=1992 0.588  0.607  0.619  0.624  0.688   
  (0.49) (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.48)  (0.46) 
#obs 425  587  485  716  1359 
(standard deviations in parentheses.)  There is missing income data on 57 single males, 87 single females, 73 married 




Probability of Giving to Specific Charities     
 
 
   
Single 
Males 
   
Single  
Females 
   
Married  
Males 
   
Married  
Females 
   
Couples 
   
Health 
   
0.209 
   
0.242 
   
0.272 
   
0.388 
   

























































































































(0.31)   





















(0.22)   











































(0.41)   














































































(standard deviations in parentheses.) 
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Table A4  
Summary Statistics 
Amount Given to Specific Charities     
 
 
   
Single 
Males 
   
Single  
Females 
   
Married  
Males 
   
Married  
Females 
   
Couples 
   
Health 
   
38.60 
   
29.37 
   
69.26 
   
52.37 
   

























































































































(113.11)   





















(60.62)   











































(109.15)   














































































(standard deviations in parentheses.) 
 
 
 
 
 